Showing posts with label spiritual junk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label spiritual junk. Show all posts

Thursday, January 08, 2015

[books i've been reading]

The Challenge of Jesus
by N.T. Wright

I'm rereading N.T. Wright's The Challenge of Jesus as a precursor to his earlier work, Jesus and the Victory of God. This book looks at the main arguments of the latter and makes them succinct and easy-to-understand for lay readers (such as myself). My hope is that my rereading this book, I'll be better geared for tackling these subjects in-depth when I get to Jesus and the Victory of God. Wright seeks to frame Jesus within 2nd Temple Palestinian Judaism, highlighting him as prophet and Messiah and locating him within the geo-political events of his day.

In Chapter One, Wright looks at the contemporary scholarly atmosphere regarding the study of Jesus, criticizing more liberal movements (such as the Jesus Seminar) and locating himself on the spectrum. He asks the question, "Why should we study Jesus afresh?" This question is pertinent, since more conservative Christians balk against any "fresh" readings of scripture (forgetting, perhaps, that their own Protestant leanings have their roots and foundation in that which they condemn). He writes, "Historical research... by no means tells us to throw away the Gospels and substitute a quite different story of our own. It does, however, warn us that our familiar readings of those Gospel stories may well have to submit to serious challenges and questionings and that we may end up reading even our favorite texts in ways we had never imagined." (27) Wright's aim is to shed light on Jesus' vocation, identity, and actions by looking at his context in 2nd Temple Palestinian Judaism; the consequent changes to how we interpret various texts (such as the parables of the Prodigal Son and the Sower, which he examines in Ch. 2) can be disturbing but also enlightening. As one reviewer of the book said, "Many Christians will find [Wright's] conclusions unsettling." But if the conclusions make sense, then we shouldn't be so apt to discard them in defense of preserving our cherished status-quo. 

In Chapter Two, Wright lays out two foundational premises about Jesus: "First, he believed that the creator God had purposed from the beginning to address and deal with the problems within his creation through Israel. Israel was not just to be an 'example' of a nation under God; Israel was to be the means through which the world would be saved. Second, Jesus believed... that this vocation would be accomplished through Israel's history reaching a great moment of climax, in which Israel herself would be saved from her enemies and through which the creator God, the covenant God, would at last bring his love and justice, his mercy and truth, to bear upon the whole world, bringing renewal and healing to all creation." (35) The first point is that of election; the second is that of eschatology. Though the geographical exile in Babylon had ended, Israel's theological exile continued, since she was ruled over by pagan superpowers. The Jewish people yearned for the true end of exile, and this would come when God's kingdom broke forth. In this vein, Wright frames Jesus as a prophet of the "kingdom of God," a phrase pregnant with meaning, not least that of God's rule being brought to bear on the present world. Jesus' contemporaries believed that God's rule would be brought to fruition, but they disagreed on how. Some Jews were isolationist: separate from the pagan world and just wait for God to usher in His kingdom. Others were compromisers: connive with the pagan forces ruling over Israel and hope to accomplish what you can in this way. Still others were revolutionaries: these zealots believed that God's kingdom would come forth through holiness and a good amount of spilled blood. Throughout the gospels we see the second two options prominently, and the days of Jesus' ministry were marked by escalating revolutionary fervor that would culminate in flat-out rebellion a few decades after Jesus' crucifixion. Jesus, as a prophet of the kingdom of God, spoke against this revolutionary zeal, and he advocated a different way of being Jewish: not living by the sword but by turning the other cheek. Jesus abhorred violence, and he declared that those who lived by violence were forsaking their calling as Jews and would meet a violent end. 

In Chapter Three, Wright paints a portrait of the Pharisees not as legalistic thought-police but as self-appointed teachers of Torah whose aim was to preserve Israel's purity and unity in the face of paganism. The Mosaic Law wasn't given, Wright argues, as a "code of conduct" by which one might scale the ladder to heaven; rather, the Law was given to preserve Israel from her pagan neighbors, and good Israelites respected the boundary-markers (the "works of the Law") that separated them from the pagans. Jesus stirred up controversy in many ways, not least of all by demolishing cherished boundary-markers, condemning the purists for missing the whole point of what it means to be a good Jew, and by threatening the purity of Israel itself by redrawing the boundary-markers around himself. Wright looks at some of the major "thought paradigms" in Jewish belief (the Sabbath, food laws, beliefs regarding the Israelite nation and its land, and the Temple) and shows how Jesus redefined them around himself. Much of the chapter revolves around Jesus' actions and declarations regarding the Temple as a focal point of his prophetic career. "[Jesus'] deepest belief regarding the Temple was eschatological: the time had come for God to judge the entire institution. [The Temple] had come to symbolize the injustice that characterized the society on the inside and on the outside, the rejection of the [Israelite] vocation to be the light of the world, the city set on a hill that would draw to itself all the peoples of the world." (64) Wright shows not only how Jesus prophesied the Temple's destruction through verbal prophecies and symbolic reenactments, nor does he stop at showing how Jesus' Temple-action condemned the Temple because of its focal point in Jewish nationalistic revolution, but he also shows how Jesus took the functions of the Temple--the place where YHWH dwelt and where forgiveness of sins could be procured--and wrapped them around himself. In Wright's words, "[During] his Galilean ministry, Jesus acted and spoke as if he was in some sense called to do and be what the Temple was and did. His offer of forgiveness with no prior condition of Temple-worship or sacrifice, was the equivalent of someone in our world offering as a private individual to issue someone else a passport or a driver's license. He was undercutting the official system and claiming by implication to be establishing a new one in its place." (65) This "new system" had Jesus at the center: forgiveness of sins was found in him, the dwelling place of God was found in him, and to be identified as a true Israelite wasn't to adhere to the Jewish boundary-markers but to be identified in him. "[Jesus' healings] were the symbolic expression of Jesus' reconstitution of Israel... His healings were the sign of a radical and healing inclusivism--not simply including everyone in a modern, laissez-faire, anything-goes fashion but dealing with the problems at the root so as to bring to birth a truly renewed, restored community whose new life would symbolize and embody the kingdom of which Jesus was speaking." (68-69) Wright summarizes his points in Chapter Three: "Jesus remained utterly anchored within first-century Judaism. His place there, however, was the place of a prophet, warning that Israel's present course was leading to disaster and urging a radical alternative upon her. His aim was to reconstitute the people of God around himself, to accomplish the real return from exile, to inaugurate the kingdom of God." (73)

In Chapter Four, Wright seeks to perform the historian's task by asking, "What was Jesus' motivation? What were his controlling stories? Who did he see himself being, and what purpose did he see in his death?" He begins with a succinct analysis of Jewish Messianic hopes, pointing out that no one expected the Messiah to be in any sense divine. Furthermore, Messianic expectations were muddled; there was no clear-cut consensus on what to expect. Given this, Wright offers a brief synopsis of the general Messianic expectations. The Messiah would be a royal king, and as such he would rebuild (or restore) the Temple and fight the decisive battle against God's enemies. The Messianic hopes were the "sharp edge of the hope of the nation as a whole, the hope for liberation, for the end of exile, for the defeat of evil, for YHWH to return to Zion." (76) Wright then looks at various Gospel texts illuminating Christ's vocation as Messiah, showing how he understood himself to be the Messiah but in a way no one else had expected. "He came as the representative of the people of YHWH to bring about the end of exile, the renewal of the covenant, the forgiveness of sins. He came to accomplish Israel's rescue, to bring God's justice to the world." (82) Wright examines the Last Supper, framing it as a renewed Passover meal: "The Last Supper was Jesus' own... kingdom-feast, the new-exodus feast." (84) Examining Jesus' crucifixion, Wright seems to take the christus victor approach to the cross: the cross was the moment and means by which God decisively defeated and dismantled the evil powers. "If we are to follow Jesus' own understanding of his vocation, it was the moment when the evil and pain of all the world were heaped up into one place, there to be dealt with once and for all." (93) Looking forward to the Christian life, Wright says, "When we speak of 'following Christ,' it is the crucified Messiah we are talking about. His death was not simply the messy bit that enables our sins to be forgiven but that can then be forgotten. The cross is the surest, truest, and deepest window on the very heart and character of the living and loving God; the more we learn about the cross in all its historical and theological dimensions, the more we discover about the One in whose image we are made and hence about our own vocation to be the cross-bearing people, the people in whose lives and service the living God is made known." (94-95)

In Chapter Five, Wright asks, "How did Jesus see himself? How did he understand his vocation?" The chapter's title, Jesus & God, catches the thrust of Wright's question: "Did Jesus believe he was God?" Wright reiterates that if we ask that question, we need to define our terms: if Jesus did believe he was God, he wouldn't do so with the Enlightenment's Deist god in mind but with the Jewish God, YHWH, whose identity is wrapped up in the Jewish themes of election and monotheism. Harking back to Exodus 6, Wright identifies this God as the Rescuer. "This God would be known as the rescuer, the one who would... accompany his people through the wilderness, leading them in the pillar of cloud and fire, and giving them his law, his own self-expression of the way of life for his people." (102) Jesus would be well aware of the Jewish hopes for this God's activity in history. "[There] was the expectation of the return of YHWH to Zion after his abandonment of Jerusalem at the time of the exile... [There] was the tradition of the enthronement of YHWH, and of one who somehow shared that throne." (103) Before plunging into the question he begged at the beginning of the chapter, Wright looks at early Christianity's perspective on Jesus' divinity. He demolishes the false trails that tell us Jesus' messiahship, and even his resurrection, prove his divinity. He gives several New Testament texts where Jesus' divinity is assumed and/or implied (1 Cor 8.1-6, the Kenosis Hymn of Phil 2.5-11, Gal 4.1-7, and the cosmic poem of Col 1.15-20). He shows that early Christians did indeed see Jesus as divine, on par with God. Such monotheism was indeed awkward, and trinitarian theology wouldn't develop for a few hundred years. At this point Wright asks the questions, "Did Jesus know he was God?" and "How did Jesus perceive himself?" Wright argues that "Jesus believed himself called to act as the new Temple. When people were in his presence, it was as if they were in the Temple. But if the Temple was itself the greatest of Israel's incarnational symbols, the conclusion was inevitable... Jesus was claiming, at least implicitly, to be the place where and the means by which Israel's God was at last personally present to and with his people. Jesus was... acting as if he were the Shekinah in person, the presence of YHWH tabernacling with his people." (113-114) He goes on, "Jesus in his entire career was acting as if he were bringing about the new exodus. God's people were in slavery; he had heard their cry and was coming to rescue them. Just as the first exodus revealed the previously hidden meaning of YHWH's name, so now Jesus would reveal the person, one might say the personality, of YHWH in action, embodied in human form. He would bring about the final redemption of God's people and thereby set in motion the fulfillment of Israel's destiny to be the light of the world." (115-116) Putting it in different terms, "In Jesus himself... we see the biblical portrait of YHWH come to life: the loving God, rolling up his sleeves (Is 52:10) to do in person the job that no one else could do; the creator God, giving new life; the God who works through his created world and supremely through his human creatures; the faithful God, dwelling in the midst of his people; the stern and tender God, relentlessly opposed to all that destroys or distorts the good creation and especially human beings, but recklessly loving all those in need and distress." (121) As to whether or not Jesus believed himself to be God, Wright speculates on pages 121-122, "I do not think Jesus 'knew he was God' in the same sense that one knows one is hungry or thirsty, tall or short. It was not a mathematical knowledge, like knowing that two and two make four... It was more like the knowledge that I have that I am loved by my family and closest friends; like the knowledge that I have that sunrise over the sea is awesome and beautiful; like the knowledge of the musician not only of what the composer intended but of how precisely to perform the piece in exactly that way--a knowledge most securely possessed, of course, when the performer is also the composer. It was, in short, the knowledge that characterizes vocation."

In Chapter Six, Wright looks at the resurrection of Christ. His mission isn't to determine the historical justifiability of the bodily resurrection of Jesus, but to ask, "If he was raised, so what?" (in other works he's done a fantastic job defending the historicity of the resurrection, but that's not his aim here). "Already by the time of Paul, our earliest written witness," Wright says on page 126, "the resurrection of Jesus is not just a single detached article of faith. It is woven into the very structure of Christian life and thought, informing (among other things) baptism, justification, ethics and the future hope both for humans and for the cosmos." Wright devotes a considerable amount of space to the rise of the early church, showing how it came about both as a "kingdom of God movement" and as a "resurrection movement," with the resurrection of Christ serving as the bulwark for the church's expansion and modus vivendi. The early Christian conviction regarding resurrection, which we see in the letters of Paul and not least in 1 Corinthians 15, isn't that it was "a matter of the opening up of a new religious experience. Nor was it proof of survival, of life after death. [The resurrection of Jesus] meant that the Scriptures had been fulfilled, that the kingdom of God had arrived, that the new age had broken in to the midst of the present age, had dawned upon a surprised and unready world... [The] entire biblical narrative had at last reached its climax, had come true in these astonishing events." (142) Through the lens of the New Testament, Wright establishes five things the early church believed regarding the resurrection (145):

(1) It was the moment when the creator God fulfilled his ancient promises to Israel, saving them from 'their sins,' i.e. their exile. It thus initiated the 'last days,' at the end of which the victory over death begun at Easter would at last be complete. 

(2) It involved the transformation of Jesus' body: it was, that is to say, neither a resuscitation of Jesus' dead body to the same sort of life nor an abandonment of that body to decomposition. Paul's account presupposes the empty tomb.

(3) It involved Jesus' being seen alive in a very limited early period, after which he was known as present to the church in a different way. These early sightings constituted those who witnessed them as apostles.

(4) It was the prototype for the resurrection of all God's people at the end of the last days.

(5) It was thus the ground not only for the future hope of Christians but for their present work.

In the final chapter, Wright asks, "So what?" If this is the story of God seen in the story of Christ, what are we to do with that in our postmodern world? To set the scene, he sketches out three aspects of postmodernity on pages 151-152: knowledge and truth, the self, and the story. Taking them in order:

(1) Where modernity thought it could know things objectively about the world, postmodernity has reminded us that there is no such thing as neutral knowledge. Everybody has a point of view, and that point of view distorts; everybody describes things the way that suits them. There is no such thing as objective truth. Likewise, there are no such things as objective values, only preferences. The cultural symbols that encapsulate this revolution are the personal stereo and the virtual-reality system: everyone creates his or her own private world.

(2) Modernity vaunted the great lonely individual, the all-powerful "I": Descartes' cogito sergo sum and the proud "I am the master of my fate, the captain of my soul." But postmodernity had deconstructed the self, the I. The "I" is just a floating signifier, a temporary and accidental collocation of conflicting forces and impulses. Just as reality collapses inward upon the knower, the knower him- or herself deconstructs.

(3) Modernity told an implicit narrative about the way the world was. It was essentially an eschatological story. World history has been steadily moving toward or at least eagerly awaiting the point where the industrial revolution and the philosophical Enlightenment would burst upon the world, bringing a new era of blessing for all. This huge overarching story--overarching stories are known in this world as metanarratives--has now been conclusively shown to be an oppressive, imperialist and self-serving story; it has brought untold misery to millions in the industrialized West and to billions in the rest of the world, where cheap labor and raw materials have been ruthlessly exploited. It is a story that serves the interests of the Western world. Modernity stands condemned of building a new tower of Babel. Postmodernity has claimed, primarily with this great narrative as the example, that all metanarratives are suspect; they are all power games.

"Collapsing reality; deconstructing selfhood; the death of the metanarrative. These are the keys to understanding postmodernity." (152) Within this cultural climate, whatever is the church to do? Using an illustration from the disciples' walking on the Emmaus Road, Wright advocates telling the story differently. And what is this story? "The exile is over--not just Israel's exile in actual and spiritual Babylon but the exile of the human race, shut out of the garden. The new world order does not look like people thought it would, but they must get used to the fact that it is here and that they are not only its beneficiaries but also its ambassadors and witnesses." (164) He continues, "[The] Messiah himself has gone to the place of pain, the place where Israel and indeed the whole world was in deep distress. He has been cast down, oppressed by the enemy... He became the suffering Israel on behalf of the suffering Israel; he went into exile--Israel's exile, the human exile from the garden, the exile of the whole cosmos--to redeem those who were in exile." (165) Wright argues, "We must get used to telling the story of God, Israel, Jesus and the world as the true metanarrative, the story of healing and self-giving love. We must get used to living as those who have truly died and risen with Christ so that our self, having been thoroughly deconstructed, can be put back together, not by the agendas that the world presses upon us but by God's Spirit." (169) The Christian vocation, then, is to "tell the story, to live by the symbols, to act out the praxis, and to answer the questions in such a way as to become in ourselves and our mission in God's world the answer to the prayer that rises inarticulately, now, not just from one puzzled psalmist but from the whole human race and indeed the whole of God's creation: 'O send out your light and your truth; let them lead me; let them bring me to your holy hill and to your dwelling.'" (171)

Saturday, December 27, 2014

"Life After Death"

In Chapter One, D'Souza lays out his assumptions. He assumes that there is a possibility, even a probability, of life after death. His assumption runs against the grain of a popular assumption in western society that makes any spiritual, immaterial, or subjective claims nothing short of comic fodder: that of reductive materialism. He defines reductive materialism as "the philosophical position that material reality is the only reality. Materialists hold that there is only one kind of stuff that exists--material stuff. We know this because material objects are objective: their existence can be verified by the techniques of science. Even human beings and other living creatures are ultimately collections of atoms and molecules, or if we break these down further, of quarks and electrons... Reductive materialists don't deny that there are subjective or immaterial experiences and entities. They insist, however, that upon examination those are caused by and are expressing purely material forces." (10) A good portion of his book focuses on this prevalent philosophy, because those who hold it simply cannot believe in life after death. As D'Souza puts it, "It is easy to see why such a philosophy leaves no room for claims that there is a reality that lies outside sense perception and outside the reach of modern science. If reductive materialism is true, then belief in an immaterial God is a fiction and life after death is impossible." (11) D'Souza isn't a reductive materialist, and throughout the book he makes excellent arguments against the belief that the material (i.e. physical) world is all that exists. Such a philosophy assumes that all that exists is what science can measure; it assumes that science covers all the bases of reality; it assumes that if scientific instruments cannot detect it, then it's hogwash. This assumption, in D'Souza's mind, is the pinnacle of arrogance: such claims cannot be verified, and reductive materialism faces a mounting host of problems philosophically and (believe it or not) scientifically. As D'Souza presents his case for the plausibility and probability of life after death, he will take shots at the chinks in the armor of reductive materialism.

In Chapter Two, D'Souza examines the claims of the reductive materialist regarding life after death. It basically goes like this: "Science hasn't shown us that there is life after death. Therefore, there must not be life after death." D'Souza argues that such thinking overdraws the reach of science. Science is tailored to tell us about the objective, material, and measurable aspects of our world; science has nothing to say about the spiritual, immaterial, or subjective realities of our world. Many scientists recognize this and testify to the fact that science does not address every avenue of reality. Others, particularly those endowed with the philosophy of reductive materialism, believe science addresses every aspect of reality because they assume that the objective, material, and measurable aspects of our world are all that exist. D'Souza says, "The atheist has no better proof that there isn't life after death than the believer has that there is. Both groups are claiming knowledge that neither group actually possesses. For the atheist, no less than for the believer, it is entirely a matter of faith." (22) The believer in life after death doesn't have proof; nor does the atheist who denies it. D'Souza relates the infamous story of the Russian cosmonaut who went up into space and claimed he didn't see God. The story has become apocryphal, expressing the atmosphere of those scientists whose probing hasn't revealed God. D'Souza finds this laughable; as he puts it, "Imagine poor Hamlet running around the castle saying, 'I've looked everywhere, and I can't find Shakespeare. I'm forced to conclude that Shakespeare doesn't exist." (24) This chapter has less to do with about the existence (or non-existence) of life after death and more to do with highlighting the arrogant assumptions within reductive materialism. So long as reductive materialism is embraced, regardless of its arrogance and inability to prove its claims, there can be no real dialogue about the possibility of life after death.

In Chapter Three, D'Souza looks at the universal conviction that there is life after death. He surveys the major world religions, both of Western and Eastern origin. He discusses Judaism and the rise of afterlife beliefs, highlighting that these beliefs arose not so that the Jews could have a "happy home" when they died but so that God Himself would be vindicated. He examines Christianity and how Platonism has affected Western conceptions of the afterlife. He then looks at Hinduism and Buddhism, exploring their eastern conceptions of Nirvana and reincarnation. "The universality of belief in an afterlife is astonishing, because life after death is not one of those empirically obvious beliefs that one would expect every society from the dawn of mankind to share. No one is surprised at the universal belief in mountains or rainstorms or animals, because such things are undeniably present to our senses. But it is an entirely different matter when all cultures in history right down to the present jointly proclaim a proposition that seems impossible to confirm through experience." (40)

In Chapter Four, D'Souza examines NDEs (or Near-Death Experiences). Most of these experiences are good, but others are bad. NDEs show the same features across time and cultures. Those who report NDEs tend to have their lives changed for the better: they become gentler, more loving people who are unafraid of death. Many are even sad that they returned to their bodies! D'Souza examines the nature of NDEs and then tackles the biggest scientific explanations: perhaps NDEs reflect a distorted brain state or is simply what happens when the brain begins to die. But as D'Souza notes, "[Nothing] in the dying brain hypothesis accounts for how clinically dead people seem to know things that are apparently out of the range of their perceptual capacities." (72) Furthermore, studies on NDEs have shown that a good number of those who experience NDEs do so when their brains are clinically dead: the brains show absolutely no activity, but yet the people experience things, hear voices, hold conversations with deceased loved ones, and can even recount things that're happening outside the bounds of their sensory perceptions. The scientific explanations for NDEs simply cannot account for this, and reductive materialism is at an impasse. If the brain and brain states are all there is, there simply cannot be any experience if the brain is dead or not working. This isn't the case with a good number of NDEs, and scientists are baffled. D'Souza writes, "[NDEs] do suggest that consciousness can and sometimes does survive death" but adds a disclaimer: "Since only some people have NDEs, it is possible that only some people's consciousness survives their death. Also, the fact of some sort of out-of-body survival in these cases tells us very little about what the afterlife is really like. By definition no one has reported a near death experience that fully crossed that barrier from this life to the next. Finally, 'survival' is not the same thing as 'immortality,' because theoretically we could survive our deaths and still lose our consciousness shortly thereafter." (72) As an aside, D'Souza points out that one of the two major groups that attack NDEs are evangelical Christians; the reason is because people of all moral calibers and religions experience good NDEs, and according to preconceived notions within the Christian worldview, this shouldn't be the case.

In Chapter Five, D’Souza examines the landscape of modern physics, showing how science itself has made belief in alternate realms—such as heaven and hell, or their equivalents—not only possible but feasible. He begins by laying out the premise of reductive materialism: “The behavior of matter is lawful, and the laws are known to scientists today. Given the recognized qualities of matter, our chances for life after death are nil, since human bodies break down and disintegrate. More-over, atheists say, the religious concept of eternity presumes the existence of exotic locales like heaven and hell. The problem is that we live in a physical universe, and these alternative realms seem to exist nowhere, or perhaps only in the imagination of the devout. Consequently it is simply ridiculous to think that humans can continue to live their lives beyond their deaths.” (73-74) After a lengthy treatment of the evolution of modern physics, he writes about quantum mechanics and string theory, multiple dimensions, dark energy, and dark matter. String Theory seeks to unify Einsteinian relativity with quantum mechanics. “[Reality] is divided not into four but rather eleven dimensions, ten of space and one of time.” These other dimensions are hidden, “somehow positioned so that they are invisible and inaccessible to us.” (78) String theory opens the door to alternate dimensions that could be the “exotic locales” of heaven and hell. “[If] space, time, and the laws of physics are local to our universe, any realms beyond our universe—if such realms exist—could operate independently of our conceptions of space and time, or without space and time altogether. Now suddenly we see the coherence of the Christian concept of eternity, a realm beyond space and time and the known laws of science.” He adds as a disclaimer, “This is not to say that these other realms beyond space, time, and the laws of science exist, but it is to say that, without the understanding of modern physics, they are possible.” (82) D’Souza then looks at the Big Bang and the Anthropic Principle (the fine-tuning of the universe). “Basically we are in a fine-tuned universe, which looks like it was tuned by a creator, but science can’t really admit the obvious, and so scientists have to posit many universes that they have no evidence for in order to explain why we have the one fine-tuned universe we do inhabit.” (87) One way physicists have tried to get out from under the rug of the anthropic principle is by postulating a multiverse, so that our universe with all its “fine-tuned constants” is just one of a limitless number of universes. There’s absolutely zero evidence for this, but the multiverse theory has gained ground because it does away with the need for a fine-tuner; it does away with the need to explain why our universe is the way it is. He quotes cosmologist Bernard Carr, “If there is only one universe, you might have to have a fine-tuner. If you don’t want God, you’d better have a multiverse.” But as physicist Steven Barr noted, “the God hypothesis is quite consistent with the possibility of multiple universes.” (87) D’Souza’s main thrust in this chapter is that “Atheists can no longer ridicule as unscientific the idea of eternal places beyond time, or of invisible matter that isn’t like our matter, or of realms that have their own laws and their own modes of being.” (88) He continues, “Modern physics has expanded our horizons and shown how life after death is possible within an existing framework of physical reality. The materialist objection has proven to be a dud; in fact, modern physics calls materialism itself into question.” (89)

In Chapter Six, D’Souza looks at evolutionary biology to make the argument that we see an uneniable teleology. As he summarizes in the last chapter, “Modern biology shows an evolutionary transition from matter to mind that does not seem random or accidental but rather built into the script of nature. This natural teleology from nonliving matter to living things to contemplative minds is a vital clue that nature progresses from the material to the immaterial, and from the perishable to the imperishable, so too may we. Like nature itself, we may be in a natural transition from living beings made up of matter to minds that are not subject to the limitations of matter.” (220)

In Chapter Seven, D’Souza examines the riddles of the human mind. Reductive materialists reject dualism, the concept that the brain and the mind are distinct, quoting neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran, who declares that “All the richness of our mental life—all our feelings, our emotions, our thoughts, our ambitions, our love lives, our religious sentiments, and even what each of us regards as his or her own intimate private self—is simply the activity of these little specks of jelly in our heads, in our brains. There is nothing else.” (110) An unnamed Dutch physiologist put it succinctly: “[The] brain secretes thoughts as the kidney secretes urine.” (111) The premise of reductive materialism demands that dualism be rejected, and arguments to explain the mind as a physiological attribute have arisen. Despite evidence to the contrary, which D’Souza shows, reductive materialists argue that the mind is the brain, or that brain states are equivalent to the mind. Another argument is that the mind is a by-product of the brain; “This means that the mind is a kind of shadow that rides alongside the brain. The brain produces the mind in the same way that fire produces smoke.” (115) D’Souza, upholding a dualist approach to the mind and the brain, argues that the brain is a transmitting organ. This idea isn’t original to him. “We cannot assume that brain states cause mental activity, because there is a second possibility. This is that the brain is a kind of gateway or receiver for the mind. William James, the founder of modern psychology, explored this idea… [He] argued that the brain serves not as a causal but as a transmission vehicle for the mind. Just as a prism or a lens allows light to pass, just as the keys of an organ channel wind and air in various ways, so the brain is an apparatus for channeling feelings and thoughts. Sure, James conceded, when the human brain dies, those feelings and thoughts, and their underlying consciousness, can no longer be expressed in that way. ‘But the sphere of being that supplied the consciousness would still be intact.’… [He] hypothesized the existence of a cosmic immaterial realm that, even while we are alive, supplies consciousness through our brains. When our brains die, this consciousness goes on, not because it enjoys life after death, but because it never died in the first place. We perish, but our consciousness endures, perhaps all by itself, perhaps in other instantiations. There is nothing in science, [he] argued, that undermines this alternative possibility.” (113-114) By way of an analogy, D’Souza expresses this idea: “If I want to listen to Mozart, I need my radio or CD player. Without them, I couldn’t listen to a particular Mozart symphony. Destroy the player, and Mozart stops playing. But does it follow that the radio or CD causes the music itself? Of course not. These are merely instruments for the expression of sound waves.” (113) He rounds out the chapter emphatically stating, “The best evidence of contemporary neuroscience is that the mind cannot be equated with the brain, and while deterioration of the brain might impede the operation of the mind, the two are separate, which makes it possible that our immaterial minds and consciousness might survive the termination of our physical frames.” (125)

In Chapter Eight, D’Souza builds upon the previous chapter and embraces James’ “transmission” theory regarding consciousness: in short, the body and brain is a transmissive organ for the human consciousness, which is not derived from material processes. D’Souza examines a handful of the most prominent materialist approaches to human consciousness and destroys them piecemeal. He advocates James’ approach to human consciousness: “[A] central feature of our identity and humanity operates outside the recognized physical laws of nature. One of those laws is, of course, mortality for all living bodies. But consciousness is not part of the body. Nor is consciousness ‘in’ the body in the same way that nerves or neurons are. Consciousness merely comes with the body and operates through the body. The body serves as a kind of receiver and transmitter for consciousness, not its author or manufacturer. What William James termed the ‘transmissive’ doctrine of consciousness, in which our individual consciousness is derived from and dependent on an outer cosmic source, now seems far more plausible than the materialist alternative.” (136-137) Science cannot account for consciousness and free will, so that D’Souza can write, “[Two] central features of human nature—consciousness and free will—that are irreducible to matter and appear to be independent from it. Even more remarkable, consciousness and free will have no natural explanation and seem to function beyond the bounds of physical law. Things that are defined by physical law, such as human bodies and human brains, are perishable or destructible. Consciousness and free will, unbound by those constraints, are not. Moreover, consciousness and free will are the defining features of the human soul, which requires awareness and choice in order to discriminate between right and wrong. The implication is that whatever happens to our bodies and brains after death, our souls live on.” (143-144)

In Chapter Nine, D’Souza looks at philosophy and deconstructs the arrogance of empirical realism, differentiating between perception and reality. Examining popular philosophers, D’Souza focuses on the German philosopher Schopenhauer who made the distinction between the noumenon (the world as it is) and the phenomenon (the world as we perceive it). “Schopenhauer says that if the self is nonumenal and the noumenal is undifferentiated, that means that whatever our phenomenal differences, we humans are, in the ultimate ground of our being, one. Perhaps at some level, [he] suggests, we recognize this. And this explains compassion, the ability of people to identify with each other, share each other’s pain, and help even when it involves some cost or sacrifice. [His] doctrine of a universal human connection implies that if we hurt each other we are, whether we realize it or not, hurting ourselves. One fascinating feature of this argument is that whether or not it is true, humans certainly on many occasions act as if it were true.” (160-161) Thus, “[Fear] of death is itself an illusion because the real or noumenal part of us cannot die. So far from denying the afterlife, Schopenhauer affirms it. ‘Your real being knows neither time, nor beginning, nor end… Your immortal part is indestructible.’ In other words, at death we are fully integrated into the realm of the noumenal from which we originally came. For [him], a pessimist about life in this world, death is a kind of liberation, a discarding of the veil of phenomenal existence and a discovery of our true oneness with each other and with infinite reality itself. When we die, our separateness is over and we live on as part of the absolute reality that is the only reality there is.” (162)

In Chapter Ten, D’Souza argues that the existence of morality presupposes some cosmic justice and, perhaps, some cosmic realm that lies beyond our material frames. He begins by defining his terms: “[Morality is] the voice within, the interior source that Adam Smith called the ‘impartial spectator.’ Morality in this sense is an uncoercive but authoritative judge. It has no power to compel us, but it speaks with unquestioned authority… Even people who most flagrantly repudiate morality—say a chronic liar or a rapacious thief—inevitably respond to detection with excuses and rationalizations… Morality supplies a universal criterion or standard even though this standard is almost universally violated.” (172) On pages 166-167, D’Souza states the problem that morality poses for reductive materialists: “Unlike material objects and all other living creatures, we humans inhabit two domains: the way things are, and the way things ought to be. We are moral animals who recognize that just as there are natural laws that govern every object in the universe, there are also moral laws that govern the behavior of one special object in the universe, namely us. While the universe is externally moved by ‘facts,’ we are internally moved also by ‘values.’ Yet these values defy natural and scientific explanation because physical laws, as discovered by science, concern only the way things are and not the way they ought to be. Moreover, the essence of morality is to curtail and to contradict the powerful engine of human self-interest, giving morality and undeniable anti-evolutionary thrust.” (166-167) To put it another way, “Evolution is descriptive: it says how we do behave. Morality is prescriptive: it says how we should behave. And beyond this, evolutionary theory appears to run in the opposite direction from moral behavior. Evolution implies that we are selfish creatures who seek to survive and reproduce in the world. Indeed we are, but we are also unselfish creatures who seek the welfare of others, sometimes in preference to our own. We are participants in the game of life, understandably partial to our own welfare, while morality stands aloof, taking the impartial or ‘God’s eye’ view, directing us to act for the good of others. In sum, while evolution provides a descriptive account of human self-interest, morality provides a standard of human behavior that frequently operates against self-interest.” (172-173) Reductive materialists have sought to answer for this in a variety of theories: Darwin’s “Group Selection,” kin selection, altruism as genetic selfishness, the presence of morality to enhance one’s reputation, and reciprocal altruism. None can explain the existence of morality or why we feel we ought to behave morally, even when we run in the opposite direction. D’Souza argues that “the presupposition of cosmic justice, achieved not in this life but in another life beyond the grave, is by far the best and in some respects the only explanation [for the existence of moral values that stand athwart our animal nature]. This presupposition fully explains why humans continue to espouse goodness and justice even when the world is evil and unjust.” (167) He continues, “Now let’s make the supposition that there is cosmic justice after death and ask, does this help to explain the great mystery of human morality? It seems clear that it does. Humans recognize that there is no ultimate goodness and justice in this world, but they continue to uphold these ideals. In their interior conscience, humans judge themselves not by the standard of the shrewd self-aggrandizer but by that of the impartial spectator. We admire the good man, even when he comes to a bad end, and revile the successful scoundrel who got away with it. Evolutionary theories predict the reverse: if morality were merely a product of crafty and successful calculation, we should cherish crafty schemers and aspire to be like them. But we don’t. Rather, we act as if there is a moral law to which we are accountable. We are judged by our consciences as if there is an ultimate tribunal in which our actions will be pronounced ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty.’ There seems to be no reason for us to hold these standards and measure our life against them if the standards aren’t legislative in some sense. But if they are legislative, then their jurisdiction must be in another world since it is clearly not in this world. So the presupposition of cosmic justice, in an existence beyond this one, makes sense of human moral standards and moral obligation in a way that evolutionary theories cannot.” (180-181) D’Souza sees us as having one foot in two different worlds: “We humans—atheists no less than religious believers—inhabit two worlds. The first is the evolutionary world; let’s call this Realm A. Then there is the next world; let’s call this Realm B. The remarkable fact is that we, who live in Realm A, nevertheless have the standards of Realm B built into our natures. This is the voice of morality, which makes us dissatisfied with our selfish natures and continually hopeful that we can rise above them… [Morality] cannot coerce us because it is the legislative standard of another world; at the same time, it is inescapable and authoritative for us because our actions in this world will be finally and unavoidably adjudicated in the other world.” (182)

In Chapters Eleven and Twelve, D’Souza looks at how belief in an afterlife is both good for society and good for our personal lives. There’s a lot of great material here, more geared towards refuting those who advocate the idea that religion (or faith) is bad for us; what it says in regards to the existence of life after death is virtually nil. Here I can’t help but agree with Richard Dawkins, who declares that these issues—whether belief in God, morality, or life after death is helpful—are irrelevant. Dawkins argues that whether or not a belief is “good” for us has no bearing whatsoever on the truthfulness of the belief. Of course, Dawkins can write about the “badness” of religion and faith and act as if it has any bearing whatsoever on the truth, and in so doing commits the fallacy he opposes; but that point’s neither here nor there. In Chapter Thirteen, D’Souza squeezes in a chapter on the resurrection of Jesus, making an argument for its historicity (following the arguments given by N.T. Wright in “The Resurrection of the Son of God”).

My take on this book? It’s damned good, at least until the last three chapters. I say this only because D’Souza’s thesis is to look at the plausibility of life after death from a scientific, psychological, and philosophical point-of-view. The last three chapters come as add-ons; chapters eleven and twelve say nothing regarding the plausibility of life after death, and chapter thirteen just feels awkward. I understand why he put it in there, since he’s a Christian, but I have to be honest: I feel it detracts from the book as a whole, even though I agree with his conclusions.

Saturday, December 20, 2014

"What's so Amazing about Grace?" (III)

"There is thus clearly a sense in which the message of "justification by faith only" can be dangerous, and likewise with the message that salvation is entirely of grace... I would say to all preachers: If your preaching of salvation has not been misunderstood in that way, then you had better examine your sermons again, and you had better make sure that you really are preaching the salvation that is offered in the New Testament to the ungodly, to the sinner, to those who are enemies of God. There is this kind of dangerous element about the true presentation of the doctrine of salvation." (177-178, quoting Martin Lloyd-Jones)

"People divide into two types: not the guilty and the "righteous," as many people think, but rather two different types of guilty people. There are guilty people who acknowledge their wrongs, and guilty ones who do not." (180-181)

"[Repentance] is what I call the 'catch' to grace. It must be received, and the Christian term for that act is repentance, the doorway to grace. C.S. Lewis said repentance is not something God arbitrarily demands of us; 'It is simply a description of what going back is like.' In terms of the parable of the Prodigal Son, repentance is the flight home that leads to joyful celebration. It opens the way to a future, to a relationship restored." (182)

"[God] awakes guilt for my own benefit. God seeks not to crush me but to liberate me, and liberation requires a defenseless spirit like that of the woman caught red-handed, not the haughty spirit of the Pharisees [in John 8]." (182)

"It is possible, warns the biblical writer Jude, to 'change the grace of our God into a license for immorality.' Not even an emphasis on repentance erases this danger completely... At first a devious idea forms in the back of the mind. It's something I want. Yeah, I know, it's wrong. But why don't I just ahead anyway? I can always get forgiveness later. The idea grows into an obsession, and ultimately grace becomes 'a license for immorality.'" (183-184)

"If you know in advance you'll be forgiven, why not join the bacchanalian pagans? Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow God will forgive... If grace increases as sin increases, then why not sin as much as possible in order to give God more opportunity to extend grace? [St. Paul says] 'We died to sin; how can we live in it any longer?'... No Christian resurrected to new life should be pining for the grave. Sin has the stench of death about it. Why would anyone choose it? (185)

"A friend of mine who led a Bible study [on Romans 6] had one college coed come to him afterwards with a puzzled expression. 'I know it says we've died to sin,' she said. 'But in my life sin seems very much alive.' Paul, a realist, recognized this fact, or else he would not have advised us in the same passage, 'Count yourselves dead to sin' and 'Do not let sin reign in your mortal body.'" (186)

"'Shall we sin because we are not under law but under grace?' Does grace offer a license, a sort of free pass through the ethical maze of life?... Again Paul lets out an incredulous 'God forbid!' How do you answer someone whose main goal in life is to push the outer edges of the envelope of grace? Has such a person ever experienced grace?" (186-187)

"Sin is a slave master that controls us whether we like it or not. Paradoxically, a headlong pursuit of freedom often turns into bondage: insist on the freedom to lose your temper whenever you feel anger, and you will find yourself a slave to rage." (187)

"What is required is the renunciation of the ego, and this is expressed perfectly in the phrase of Pascal: 'Entire and sweet renunciation. Absolute submission to Jesus Christ and my spiritual director.' People may laugh and scoff at you for being unworthy of the title of free man and for having to submit yourself to a master... But this enslavement is really a miraculous liberation, for even when you were free you spent the whole time forging chains for yourself and putting them on, riveting them tighter and tighter each moment. During the years when you thought you were free you submitted like an ox to the yoke of your countless hereditary ills. From the hour of your birth not one of your crimes has failed to go on living, has failed to imprison you more and more every day, has failed to beget other crimes. The Man you submit yourself to does not want you to be free to be a slave: he breaks the circle of your fetters, and, against your half-extinguished and still-smouldering desires, He kindles and re-kindles the fire of Grace. (188, quoting Francois Mauriac)

"[If] we approach God with a 'What can I get away with?' attitude, it proves we do not grasp what God has in mind for us. God wants something far beyond the relationship I might have with a slave master, who will enforce my obedience with a whip. God is not a boss or a business manager or a magic genie to serve at our command. Indeed, God wants something more intimate than the closest relationship on earth, the lifetime bond between a man and a woman. What God wants is not a good performance, but my heart. I do 'good works' for my wife not in order to earn credit but to express my love for her. Likewise, God wants me to serve 'in the new way of the Spirit': not out of compulsion but out of desire. 'Discipleship,' says Clifford Williams, 'simply means the life which springs from grace.'" (189-190)

"Paul begins most of his letters with a summary of the riches we possess in Christ. If we comprehend what Christ has done for us, then surely out of gratitude we will strive to live 'worthy' of such great love. We will strive for holiness not to make God love us but because he already does. As Paul told Titus, it is the grace of God that 'teaches us to say "No" to ungodliness and worldly passions, and to live self-controlled, upright and godly lives." (190)

"When Augustine made the famous statement, 'If you but love God you may do as you incline,' he was perfectly serious. A person who truly loves God will be inclined to please God, which is why Jesus and Paul both summed up the entire law in the simple command, 'Love God.'" (191)

"The church, says Robert Farrar Capon, 'has spent so much time inculcating in us the fear of making mistakes that she has made us like ill-taught piano students: we play our songs, but we never really hear them because our main concern is not to make music but to avoid some flub that will get us in the dutch.'" (208)

"Legalism stands like a stripper on the sidelines of faith, seducing us toward an easier way. It teases, promising some of the benefits of faith but unable to deliver what matters most. As Paul wrote to the legalists of his day, 'For the kingdom of God is not a matter of eating and drinking, but of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.'" (209)

"At first glance legalism seems hard, but actually freedom in Christ is the harder way. It is relatively easy not to murder, hard to reach out in love; easy to avoid a neighbor's bed, but hard to keep a marriage alive; easy to pay taxes, hard to serve the poor. When living in freedom, I must remain open to the Spirit for guidance. I am more aware of what I have neglected than what I have achieved. I cannot hide behind a mask of behavior, like the hypocrites, nor can I hide behind facile comparisons with other Christians." (209)

"Jesus proclaimed unmistakably that God's law is so perfect and absolute that no one can achieve righteousness. Yet God's grace is so great that we do not have to. By striving to prove how much they deserve God's love, legalists miss the whole point of the gospel, that it is a gift from God to people who don't deserve it. The solution to sin is not to impose an ever-stricter code of behavior. It is to know God." (210)

"I see the confusion of politics and religion as one of the greatest barriers to grace. C.S. Lewis observed that almost all crimes of Christian history have come about when religion is confused with politics. Politics, which always runs by the rules of [power], allures us to trade away grace for power, a temptation the church has often been unable to resist." (232-233)

"Attempts to perfect Christian societies in this world, whether conducted by popes or revolutionaries, have tended to degenerate into red terrors." (234, quoting Paul Johnson)

"Who is my enemy? The abortionist? The Hollywood producer polluting our culture? The politician threatening my moral principles? The drug lord ruling my inner city? If my activism, however well-motivated, drives out love, then I have misunderstood Jesus' gospel. I am stuck with law, not the gospel of grace." (242)

"Jesus declared that we should have one distinguishing mark: not political correctness or moral superiority, but love. Paul added that without love nothing we do--no miracle of faith, no theological brilliance, no flaming personal sacrifice--will avail (1 Corinthians 13)." (242)

"If the world despises a notorious sinner, the church will love her. If the world cuts off aid to the poor and suffering, the church will offer food and healing. If the world oppresses, the church will raise up the oppressed. If the world shames a social outcast, the church will proclaim God's reconciling love. If the world seeks profit and self-fulfillment, the church seeks sacrifice and service. If the world demands retribution, the church dispenses grace. If the world splinters into factions, the church joins together in unity. If the world destroys its enemies, the church loves them. That, at least, is the vision of the church in the New Testament: a colony of heaven in a hostile world." (262)

"Perhaps the reason politics has proved such a snare for the church is that power rarely coexists with love." (263)

"Karl Barth made the comment that Jesus' gift of forgiveness, of grace, was to him more astonishing than Jesus' miracles. Miracles broke the physical laws of the universe; forgiveness broke the moral rules. 'The beginning of good is perceived in the midst of bad... The simplicity and comprehensiveness of grace--who shall measure it?'" (271)

"How does a grace-full Christian look? The Christian life, I believe, does not primarily center on ethics or rules but rather involves a new way of seeing. I escape the force of spiritual 'gravity' when I begin to see myself as a sinner who cannot please God by any method of self-improvement or self-enlargement. Only then can I turn to God for outside help--for grace--and to my amazement I learn that a holy God already loves me despite my defects. I escape the force of gravity against when I recognize my neighbors also as sinners, loved by God. A grace-full Christian is one who looks at the world through 'grace-tinted lenses.'" (271-272)

"We creatures, we jolly beggars, give glory to God by our dependence. Our wounds and defects are the very fissures through which grace might pass. It is our human destiny on earth to be imperfect, incomplete, weak, and mortal, and only by accepting that destiny can we... receive grace. Only then can we draw close to God." (273)

"Christianity has a principle, 'Hate the sin but love the sinner,' which is more easily preached than practiced. If Christians could simply recover that practice, modeled so exquisitely by Jesus, we would go a long way toward fulfilling our calling as dispensers of God's grace. For a long time, C.S. Lewis reports, he could never understand the hairsplitting distinction between hating a person's sin and hating the sinner. How could you hate what a man did and not hate the man? 'But years later it occured to me that there was one man to whom I had been doing this all my life--namely myself. However much I might dislike my own cowardice or conceit or greed, I went on loving myself. There had never been the slightest difficulty about it. In fact the very reason I hated the things was that I loved the man. Just because I loved myself, I was sorry to find that I was the sort of man who did those things.'" (280-281)

Friday, December 19, 2014

"What's so Amazing about Grace?" (II)

"To be a Christian means to forgive the inexcusable, because God has forgiven the inexcusable in you." (64, quoting C.S. Lewis)

"It is no sweet platonic ideal to be dispersed in the world like air-freshener sprayed from a can. Forgiveness is achingly difficult, and long after you've forgiven, the wound--my dastardly deeds--lives on in memory. Forgiveness is an unnatural act." (84)

"Behind every act of forgiveness lies a wound of betrayal, and the pain of being betrayed does not easily fade away." (84)

"The very taste of forgiveness seems somehow wrong. Even when we have committed a wrong, we want to earn our way back into the injured party's good graces. We prefer to crawl on our knees, to wallow, to do penance, to kill a lamb..." (85)

"Despite a hundred sermons on forgiveness, we do not forgive easily, nor find ourselves easily forgiven. Forgiveness, we discover, is always harder than the sermons make it out to be." (86, quoting Elizabeth Warren)

"'Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us.' At the center of the Lord's Prayer, which Jesus taught us to recite, lurks the unnatural act of forgiveness. Roman bathers urged their gods to abet human justice; Jesus hinged God's forgiveness on our willingness to forgive unjust acts. Charles Williams has said of the Lord's Prayer, "'No word in English carries a greater possibility of terror than the little word 'as' in that clause.' What makes the 'as' so terrifying? The fact that Jesus plainly links our forgiven-ness by the Father with our forgiving-ness of fellow human beings. Jesus' next remark could not be more explicit: 'If you do not forgive their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins.'" (87)

"Jesus requires--no, demands--a response of forgiveness. So urgent is the need for forgiveness that it takes precedence over 'religious' duties: "'Therefore, if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to your brother, then come and offer your gift.' Jesus concluded his parable of the unforgiving servant with a scene of the master turning over the servant to jailers to be tortured. 'This is how my heavenly Father will treat each of you unless you forgive your brother from the heart,' Jesus said. I fervently wish these words were not in the Bible, but there they are, from the lips of Christ himself. God has granted us a terrible agency: by denying forgiveness to others, we are in effect determining them unworthy of God's forgiveness, and thus so are we. In some mysterious way, divine forgiveness depends on us." (87-88)

"As we can allow ourselves to let go, to break the cycle, to start over, God can allow himself to let go, break the cycle, start over." (87)

"Through the medium of prayer we go to our enemy, stand by his side, and plead for him to God. Jesus does not promise that when we bless our enemies and do good to them they will not despitefully use and persecute us. They certainly will. But not even that can hurt or overcome us, so long as we pray for them... We are doing vicariously for them what they cannot do for themselves." (89, quoting Dietrich Bonhoeffer)

"'Do not take revenge, my friends, but leave room for God's wrath; for it is written, "It is mine to avenge; I will repay, says the Lord.'" At last I understood, in the final analysis, forgiveness is an act of faith. By forgiving another, I am trusting that God is a better justice-maker than I am. By forgiving, I release my own right to get even and leave all issues of fairness for God to work out. I leave in God's hands the scales that must balance justice and mercy." (92)

"Forgiveness--undeserved, unearned--can cut the cords and let the oppressive burden of guilt roll away. The New Testament shows a resurrected Jesus leading Peter by the hand through a three-fold ritual of forgiveness. Peter need not go through life with the guilty, hangdog look of one who has betrayed the Son of God. Oh, no. On the backs of such transformed sinners Christ would build his church." (104)

"In The Art of Forgiving, Lewis Smedes makes the striking observation that the Bible portrays God going through progressive stages when he forgives, much as we humans do. First, God rediscovers the humanity of the person who wronged him, by removing the barrier created by sin. Second, God surrenders his right to get even, choosing instead to bear the cost in his own body. Finally, God revises his feelings toward us, finding a way to'justify' us so that when he looks upon us he sees his own adopted children, with his divine image restored." (106)

"When Jesus loved a guilt-laden person and helped him, he saw in him an erring child of God. He saw in him a human being whom his Father loved and grieved over because he was going wrong. He saw him as God originally designed and meant him to be, and therefore he saw through the surface layer of grime and dirt to the real man underneath. Jesus did not identify the person with his sin, but rather saw in this sin something alien, something that really did not belong to him, something that merely chained and mastered him, and from which he could free him and bring him back to his real self. Jesus was able to love men because he loved through right through the layer of mud." (175)

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

"What's so Amazing about Grace?" (I)


I first heard about Philip Yancey's book in bible college. Our theology professor, a man who read 3-4 books a week and who had been doing so for decades, told us that What's So Amazing About Grace? was the most influential book he'd ever read. I found that odd, coming from him, since Yancey tends to write books for the masses rather than for theologians. I started reading this book Monday and finished it Tuesday, and I can see now why my professor extolled it. Yancey blends stories and meditations on Jesus' parables to cut through the bullshit of religion to catch a glimpse of the heart of God.

Yancey defines grace: "Grace means there is nothing we can do to make God love us more--no amount of spiritual calisthenics and renunciations, no amoung of knowledge gained from seminaries and divinity schools, no amount of crusading on behalf of righteous causes. And grace means there is nothing we can do to make God love us less--no amount of racism or pride or pornography or adultery or even murder. Grace means that God already loves us as much as an infinite God can possibly love." He continues, "I cannot moderate my definition of grace, because the Bible forces me to make it as sweeping as possible. God is 'the God of all grace,' in the apostle Peter's words. And grace means there is nothing I can do to make God love me more, and nothing I can do to make God love me less. It means that I, even I who deserve the opposite, am invited to take my place at a table in God's family." (page 70)

In three posts I'm going to convey some of my favorite quotes. The book is basically split into three parts: God's grace towards us, our grace towards others, and the church's role of dispensing grace to the world. The last several chapters are a damning rebuke on evangelical Christianity's politically-bent motivations that always fail to miss the heart of the gospel: "We're a bunch of bastards, but God loves us anyways."

*  *  *

"Many years ago I was driven to the conclusion that the two major causes of most emotional problems among evangelical Christians are these: the failure to understand, receive, and live out God's unconditional grace and forgiveness; and the failure to give out that unconditional love, forgiveness, and grace to other people... We read, we hear, we believe a good theology about grace. But that's not the way we live. The good news of the Gospel of grace has not penetrated the level of our emotions." (15, quoting David Seamands)

"Catholics, Mennonites, Churches of Christ, Lutherans, and Southern Baptists all have their own custom agenda of legalism. You gain the church's, and presumably God's, approval by following the prescribed pattern." (30)

"Eugene Peterson draws a contrast between Augustine and Pelagius, two fourth-century theological opponents. Pelagius was urbane, courteous, convincing, and liked by everyone. Augustine squandered away his youth in immorality, had a strange relationship with his mother, and made many enemies. Yet Augustine started from God's grace and got it right, whereas Pelagius started from human effort and got it wrong. Augustine passionately pursued God; Pelagius methodically worked to please God. Peterson goes on to say that Christians tend to be Augustinian in theory but Pelagian in practice. They work obsessively to please other people and even God." (70)

"By tradition, one wears faith with the solemnity of a mourner, the gravity of a mask of tragedy, and the dedication of a Rotary badge." (31, quoting Erma Bombeck)

"The church... communicates ungrace through its lack of unity. Mark Twain used to say he put a dog and cat in a cage together as an experiment, to see if they could get along. They did, so he put in a bird, pig, and goat. They, too, got along fine after a few adjustments. Then he put in a Baptist, Presbyterian, and Catholic; soon there was not a living thing left." (33)

"I have been picking on Christians because I am one, and see no reason to pretend we are better than we are." (33)

"Guilt was not my problem as I felt it. What I felt most was a glob of unworthiness that I could not tie down to any concrete sins I was guilty of. What I needed more than pardon was a sense that God accepted me, owned me, held me, affirmed me, and would never let go of men even if he was not too much impressed with what he had on his hands." (36, quoting Lewis Smedes)

"The disease anorexia is a direct product of ungrace: hold up the ideal of beautiful, skinny models, and teenage girls will starve themselves to death in an attempt to reach that ideal. A peculiar offshoot of modern Western civilization, anorexia has no known history and rarely occurs in places like modern Africa (where plumpness, not thinness, is admired)." (37)

"The notion of God's love coming to us free of charge, no strings attached, seems to go against every instinct of humanity. The Buddhist eight-fold path, the Hindu doctrine of karma, the Jewish covenant, and Muslim code of law--each of these offers a way to earn approval. Only Christianity dares to make God's love unconditional." (45)

"How different [are Jesus' parables] from my own childhood notions about God: a God who forgives, yes, but reluctantly, after making the penitent squirm. I imagined God as a distant thundering figure who prefers fear and respect to love. Jesus tells instead [in the parable of the Prodigal Son] of a father publicly humiliating himself by rushing out to embrace a son who has squandered half the family fortune. There is no solemn lecture, 'I hope you've learned your lesson!' Instead, Jesus tells of the father's exhilaration--'This my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found'--and then adds the buoyant phrase, 'they began to make merry.'" (51)

"What blocks forgiveness is not God's reticence... but ours. God's arms are always extended; we are the ones who turn away." (51-52)

"The gospel is not at all what we would come up with on our own. I, for one, would expect to honor the virtuous over the profligate. I would expect to have to clean up my act before even applying for an audience with a Holy God. But Jesus told of God ignoring a fancy religious teacher and turning instead to an ordinary sinner who pleads, 'God, have mercy.' Throughout the Bible, in fact, God shows a marked preference for "real" people over "good" people. In Jesus' own words, 'There will be more rejoincing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to repent.'" (54)

"Ask people what they must do to get to heaven and most reply, 'Be good.' Jesus' stories contradict that answer. All we must do is cry, 'Help!' God welcomes home anyone who will have him and, in fact, has made the first move already." (54)

"[Jesus' parables] were not merely pleasant stories to hold listeners' attention or literary vessels to hold theological truths. They were, in fact, the template of Jesus' life on earth. He was the sepherd who left the safety of the fold for the dark and dangerous night outside. To his banquets he welcomed tax collectors and reprobates and whores. He came for the sick and not the well, for the unrighteous and not the righteous. And to those who betrayed him--especially the disciples, who forsook him at his time of greatest need--he responded like a lovesick father." (55)

"At the center of Jesus' parables of grace stands a God who takes the initiative towards us: a lovesick father who runs to meet the prodigal, a king who cancels a debt too large for any servant to reimburse, an employer who pays eleventh-hour workers the same as the first-hour crew, a banquet-giver who goes out to the highways and byways in search of undeserving guests." (91)

"God dispenses gifts, not wages. None of us gets paid according to merit, for none of us comes close to satisfying God's requirements for a perfect life. If we paid on the basis of fairness, we would all end up in hell." (62)

"[If] I care to listen, I hear a loud whisper from the gospel that I did not get what I deserved. I deserved punishment and got forgiveness. I deserved wrath and got love. I deserved debtor's prison and got instead a clean credit history. I deserved stern lectures and crawl-on-your-knees-repentance; I got a banquet... spread for me." (64)

"'But where sin increased, grace increased all the more.' Paul knew better than anyone who has ever lived that grace comes undeserved, at God's initiative and not our own. Knocked flat on the ground on the way to Damascus, he never recovered from the impact of grace: the word appears no later than the second sentence in every one of his letters... Paul--the "chief of sinners" he once called himself--knew beyond doubt that God loves people because of who God is, not because of who we are." (66)

"[Grace] costs nothing for the recipients but everything for the giver. God's grace is not a grandfatherly display of 'niceness,' for it cost the exorbitant price of Calvary. 'There is only one real law--the law of the universe,' said Dorothy Sayers. 'It may be fulfilled either by way of judgment or by the way of grace, but it must be fulfilled.' By accepting the judgment in his own body, Jesus fulfilled that law, and God found a way to forgive." (66)

"Weighed down by repeated failures, lost hope, a sense of unworthiness, we pull around ourselves a shell that makes us almost impervious to grace. Like foster children who choose again and again to return to abusive families, we turn stubbornly away from grace." (68)

"At a seminar, [Brennan Manning] referred to Jesus' closest friend on earth, the disciple named John, identified in the Gospels as 'the one Jesus loved.' Manning said, 'If John were to be asked, "What is your primary identity in life?" he would not reply, "I am a disciple, an apostle, an evangelist, an author of one of the four Gospels," but rather, "I am the one Jesus loves.'" What would it mean, I ask myself, if I too came to the place where I saw my identity in life as 'the one Jesus loves'? How differently would I view myself at the end of a day?" (68)

"God exists outside of time, the theologians tell us. God created time as an artist chooses a medium to work with, and is unbound by it. He sees the future and the past in a kind of eternal present. If right about this property of God, the theologians have helped explain how God can possibly call "beloved" a person as inconsistent, fickle, and temperamental as I am. When God looks upon my life graph, he sees not jagged swerves toward good and bad but rather a steady line of good: the goodness of God's Son captured in a moment of time and applied for all eternity." (69)

"There is a simple cure for people who doubt God's love and question God's grace: to turn to the Bible and examine the kind of people God loves. Jacob, who dared take God on in a wrestling match and ever after bore a wound from that struggle, became the eponym for God's people, the "children of Israel." The Bible tells of a murderer and adulterer who gained a reputation as the greatest king of the Old Testament, a "man after God's own heart." And of a church being led by a disciple who cursed and swore that he had never known Jesus. And of a missionary being recruited from the ranks of the Christian-torturers. I get mailings from Amnesty International, and as I look at their photos of men and women who have been beaten and cattle-prodded and jabbed and spit on and electrocuted, I ask myself, "What kind of human being could do that to another human being?" Then I read the book of Acts and meet the kind of person who could do such a thing--now an apostle of grace, a servant of Jesus Christ, the greatest missionary the world has ever known. If God can love that kind of person, maybe, just maybe, he can love the likes of me." (70)

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

"The New Testament & the People of God"

The New Testament & the People of God

The latest book in my queue is N.T. Wright's voluminous The New Testament and the People of God. Being the first book of his massive "Christian Origins and the Question of God" series, this book seeks to "set the stage," so-to-speak, for Wright's analysis of Christianity's origins. In this volume he examines first-century Palestinian Judaism in the context of the wider Greco-Roman world. By doing so, Wright prepares for the second book in his series, Jesus and the Victory of God, which looks at Jesus' prophetic ministry in the context of the Judaism of his day. 

The book is divided into five parts, the first two of which examines critical historical issues such as epistemology, worldviews, and critical history. Wright seeks to bridge the gap between modernist and postmodern approaches to historical study, carving a path through the ambiguous waters of historical theory. Wright argues that while history isn't comprised of bare-boned facts but interpretations of events, the events remain and thus history can be done. This is one of my favorite parts, and his work here was foundational for my 2012-2013 "Quest" regarding the justifiability of the Judeo-Christian worldview. Earlier blog posts from 2012 highlight some of Wright's key points, and here they are if you're interested in a trip down Memory Lane:

(hint: the above four lines are links)

Part three examines Wright's take on 2nd-Temple Palestinian Judaism. He looks at the history of Israel from the Babylonian exile to the Roman oppression, sketching out Judaism's plurality of beliefs, practices, and hopes. He sets the overarching Jewish worldview as follows on page 243: "Who are we? We are Israel, the chosen people of the creator god. Where are we? We are in the holy Land, focused on the Temple; but, paradoxically, we are still in exile. What is wrong? We have the wrong rulers: pagans on the one hand, compromised Jews on the other, or, half-way between, Herod and his family. We are all involved in a less-than-ideal situation. What is the solution? Our god must act again to give us the true sort of rule, that is, his own kingship exercised through properly appointed officials (a true priesthood; possibly a true king); and in the mean time Israel must be faithful to his covenant charter." 

In the final chapter of Part Three, Wright examines the facets of the Jewish hope: the inauguration of the age to come, liberation from Rome, the restoration of the Temple, and the enjoyment of their own Land. Believing they were still in exile, despite being in their own land, the Jewish people put their hopes on the renewal of the covenant prophesied through Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. Wright observes on page 301, "When Israel finally 'returned from exile,' and the Temple was (properly) rebuilt, and reinhabited by its proper occupant--this would be seen as comparable with the making of the covenant on Sinai. It would be the betrothal of YHWH and Israel, after their apparent divorce. It would be the real forgiveness of sins; Israel's god would pour out his holy spirit, so that she would be able to keep the Torah properly, from the heart. It would be the 'circumcision of the heart' of which Deuteronomy and Jeremiah had spoken. And, in a phrase pregnant with meaning for both Jews and Christians, it would above all be the 'kingdom of god.' Israel's god would become in reality what he was already believed to be. He would be King of the whole world." When this happened, there would be a vast renewal: a renewal of Israel, a renewal of humanity, a renewal of the world.

In Part Four, Wright looks at the emergence of the Christian church, seeking to sketch out its worldview, beliefs, and practices. He's straightforward, acknowledging that it's difficult to know much of anything about the earliest days of the church; nevertheless, Wright does an excellent job of examining some of the key facets to early Christianity that marked it out from its Greek and Jewish neighbors: its emphasis on global mission, sexual purity, baptism, the eucharist, a shocking ethical code, the absence of animal sacrifices, and the readiness of its adherents to suffer and die for their confessions of Jesus as Lord. On pages 369-370 Wright outlines what he believes were the "Worldview Q&A" of the early church:

Who are we? We are a new group, a new movement, and yet not new, because we claim to be the true people of the god of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the creator of the world. We are the people for whom the creator god was preparing the way through his dealings with Israel. To that extent, we are like Israel; we are emphatically monotheists, not pagan polytheists, marked out from the pagan world by our adherence to the traditions of Israel, and yet distinguished from the Jewish world in virtue of the crucified Jesus and the divine spirit, and by our fellowship in which the traditional Jewish and pagan boundary-markers are transcended.

Where are we? We are living in the world that was made by the god we worship, the world that does not yet acknowledge this true and only god. We are thus surrounded by neighbors who worship idols that are, at best, parodies of the truth, and who thus catch glimpses of reality but continually distort it. Humans in general remain in bondage to their own gods, who drag them into a variety of degrading and dehumanizing behavior-patterns. As a result, we are persecuted, because we remind the present power-structures of what they dimly know, that there is a different way to be human, and that in the message of the true god concerning his son, Jesus, notice has been served on them that their own claim to absolute power is called into question.

What is wrong? The powers of paganism still rule the world, and from time to time even find their way into the church. Persecutions arise from outside, heresies and schisms from within. These evils can sometimes be attributed to supernatural agency, whether 'Satan' or various demons. Even within the individual Christian there remain forces at work that need to be subdued, lusts which need to be put to death, party-spirit which needs to learn humility.

What is the solution? Israel's hope has been realized; the true god has acted decisively to defeat the pagan gods, and to create a new people, through whom he is to rescue the world from evil. This he has done through the true King, Jesus, the Jewish Messiah, in particular through his death and resurrection. The process of implementing this victory, by means of the same god continuing to act through his own spirit in his people, is not yet complete. One day the King will return to judge the world, and to set up a kingdom which is on a different level to the kingdoms of this present world order. When this happens those who have died as Christians will be raised to a new physical life. The present powers will be forced to acknowledge Jesus as Lord, and justice and peace will triumph at last.

Wright launches into a survey of some of the earliest Christian materials we have in our possession, beginning with the Synoptics (Matthew, Mark, and Luke), the writings of Paul, the letter to the Hebrews, and the Gospel of John, asking, "What story are these writings telling?" Wright argues that these earliest Christian writings look at Jesus and the early church as the culmination of Jewish hopes and the dawn of the promised New Age, marked by forgiveness of sins, the defeat and dismantling of evil, and God's kingdom coming to birth in the world. Wright argues against the prevalent current in gospel studies, that thread-of-thought that sees Jesus in the guise of a Stoic or Cynic teacher, deeply indebted in Greek thought, by highlighting the Jewish themes, motifs, and ideas saturating the New Testament. Gospel studies have advocated that these Jewish undertones were added to Jesus at a later date, invented by the second century church to address issues within the church. This paradigmatic approach to the gospels stands on the shoulders of a certain type of form-criticism, the criticism of which Wright devotes an entire chapter.

Traditional form-criticism looks at the forms of the gospel stories under the assumption that the majority of these stories were fabricated by the early church. This early church isn't seen as Jewish in origin but Gnostic in origin. In his damning criticism of this approach to form-criticism, Wright points out the obvious: if the gospels were created to address issues within the early church, why don't we once see the issue of circumcision? Meat sacrificed to idols, Gentile inclusion in the church, speaking in tongues... Why are these historically divisive issues barely touched upon, if mentioned at all? Wright doesn't suggest tossing out form-criticism; the logic behind form-criticism is steady, but it's missed its mark in its assumption. Wright argues for a new approach to form-criticism, an approach highlighting the Jewish forms of prophetic acts, controversies, and parables. Wright further criticizes the attention given to the supposed "Q" document (from which Luke and Matthew drew their material) and The Gospel of Thomas. Much attention has been given to the Gnostic, aphorism-driven Thomas, which Wright finds unwarranted. "It is simply the case that, on good historical grounds, [Thomas] is far more likely that the book represents a radical translation, and indeed subversion, of first-century Christianity into a quite different sort of religion, than that it represents the original of which the longer gospels are distortions."

So what is this "primitive early church" which The Gospel of Thomas subverts? In the final chapter, Wright looks at different facets of the early church, drawing on material and arguments throughout the earlier chapters, and simultaneously laying the groundwork for the next book in his series, Jesus & the Victory of God. He identifies the church as beginning as a Jewish movement and then branching out into the Gentile world, over against the recent hypotheses that the church began as a philosophical movement indebted to Greek thought and then became distorted with a Jewish atmosphere. Tying together the two main questions of the book--"What was the Jewish worldview in 2nd century Palestinian Judaism?" and "What was the worldview of the early church?"--Wright says, "First-century Jews looked forward to a public event, a great act of liberation for Israel, in and through which their god would reveal to all the world that he was not just a local, tribal deity, but the creator and sovereign of all. YHWH would reveal his salvation for Israel in the eyes of the nations; the ends of the earth would see that he had vindicated his people. The early Christians, not least in the writings that came to be called the New Testament, looked back to an event in and through which, they claimed, Israel's god had done exactly that. On this basis, the New Testament, emerging from within this strange would-be 'people of god', told the story of that people as a story rooted in Israel's past, and designed to continue into the world's future. It repeated the Jewish claim: this story concerns not just a god but God. It revised the Jewish evidence: the claim is made good, not in national liberation, but in the events concerning Jesus." (476)

The next book in Wright's series is Jesus & the Victory of God.
It's a voluminous work, and to prepare, I'm reading his book, The Challenge of Jesus.
Be prepared to be hearing about that book over the next month or two. It's a doozy.

Sunday, November 09, 2014

[sunday meditations]

Some quotes from Soren Kierkegaard:

This much is certain: The greatest thing each person can is to give himself to God utterly and unconditionally--weakness, fears, and all. For God loves obedience more than good intentions or second-best offerings, which are all too often made under the guide of weakness.

What precisely is profound in Christianity is that Christ is both our atoner and our judge, not that one is our atoner and another our judge, for then we would nevertheless come to be judged, but that the atoner and the judge are the same.

Never cease loving a person, and never give up hope for him, for even the prodigal son who had fallen most low, could still be saved; the bitterest enemy and also he who was your friend could again be your friend; love that has grown cold can be kindled.

Present-day Christendom really lives as if the situation were as follows: Christ is the great hero and benefactor who has once and for all secured salvation for us; now we must merely be happy and delighted with the innocent goods of earthly life and leave the rest to Him. But Christ is essentially the exemplar, that is we are to resemble Him, not merely profit from Him.

The Bible is very easy to understand. But we Christians are a bunch of scheming swindlers. We pretend to be unable to understand it because we know very well that the minute we understand, we are obliged to act accordingly.

The Children's Westminster Catechism: Question 4

Question: How can you glorify God? Answer: By loving him and doing what he commands. We saw in Question 3 of the Children's Catechism th...