I want to preface this post, in light of the title, by stating matter-of-factly that what's trending in my spheres of internet blogdom is in no way reflective of what's actually trending with most people. Here are three articles that I've really liked lately, with the links and a few snippets.
"[Marriage] isn't for you. You don't marry to make yourself happy, you marry to make someone else happy. More than that, your marriage isn't for yourself, you're marrying for a family. Not just for the in-laws and all of that nonsense, but for your future children. Who do you want to help you raise them? Who do you want to influence them? Marriage isn't for you. It's not about you. Marriage is about the person you married."
"[Marriage] is definitely not about making yourself happy, but it's not always about making your spouse happy either. True love is focused on God, and that sometimes means making people unhappy in order to draw them closer to God. Marriage is not about making your spouse smile or laugh every day. Marriage is not about being nice, it's about loving your spouse as God loves them. Marriage is not only about making your spouse happy, it's about making them holy."
"Marriage isn't for you, but it's not only about your spouse either. Marriage is meant to symbolize the beauty of the human soul espoused to Christ. Marriage is ultimately to bring glory to God."
The article is truly thought-provoking, and I have this coming Tuesday off work to go and hear him speak at C.C.U. Apparently his lecture at C.C.U. is going to be in the same vein as the article above, but with different emphases. Here's what an old professor (and neighbor, ironically) had to say on the upcoming lecture:
* * *
Specifically, Brueggemann is invested in the text's priority over established theologies, insofar as he has a higher
view of the text than he has of the various theologies that attempt to
control/determine the text. His particular investment is in the
text-as-revelation, and he finds ways to confront doctrinal
interestedness that runs up against the text.
So in this piece he points to the text's statement in Ex 32.14 that God repented (nacham) and wonders what this might mean. The implicit critique is that if God "repents" then perhaps God changes. B's argument is that God allows dialogue with humanity and that the dialogue God allows is of such a nature that it is also permitted to change God. He cites other examples where, in dialogue with creation, God takes a different path than the one ostensibly laid out.
Some see this as an heretical notion, mainly due to the fact that they privilege a theological fragment over the text's actual claims. Specifically, they select a section of a theological system that references God's immutability. With that in view, they imagine that B's essay necessarily contradicts Scripture . . . even though he is specifically dealing with scriptural statements . . . . and this is the point of confrontation that is so valuable: on the one hand we have this theory about immutability on the other hand we have a set of texts that seem to undermine that theory.
However, B's point here is not that God's immutability is compromised, rather that it is a part of God's immutable nature to respond to human dialogue. Insofar as that is the case, B's essay is about the how incredible it is that we have a God that will listen to us.
I'd also note that probably most Christians think that God is open to human dialogue, and indeed they likely depend on it. For example, every single time someone prays to God that a person may be "healed," then that prayer assumes God can change an existing and even, if God is "always in control," a determined path. This dialogic feature of God's character is what B is pointing to as a way to confront assumptions about how our theology about God works.
So in this piece he points to the text's statement in Ex 32.14 that God repented (nacham) and wonders what this might mean. The implicit critique is that if God "repents" then perhaps God changes. B's argument is that God allows dialogue with humanity and that the dialogue God allows is of such a nature that it is also permitted to change God. He cites other examples where, in dialogue with creation, God takes a different path than the one ostensibly laid out.
Some see this as an heretical notion, mainly due to the fact that they privilege a theological fragment over the text's actual claims. Specifically, they select a section of a theological system that references God's immutability. With that in view, they imagine that B's essay necessarily contradicts Scripture . . . even though he is specifically dealing with scriptural statements . . . . and this is the point of confrontation that is so valuable: on the one hand we have this theory about immutability on the other hand we have a set of texts that seem to undermine that theory.
However, B's point here is not that God's immutability is compromised, rather that it is a part of God's immutable nature to respond to human dialogue. Insofar as that is the case, B's essay is about the how incredible it is that we have a God that will listen to us.
I'd also note that probably most Christians think that God is open to human dialogue, and indeed they likely depend on it. For example, every single time someone prays to God that a person may be "healed," then that prayer assumes God can change an existing and even, if God is "always in control," a determined path. This dialogic feature of God's character is what B is pointing to as a way to confront assumptions about how our theology about God works.
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